We investigate the problem of guessing a discrete random variable Y under a privacy constraint dictated by another correlated discrete random variable X, where both guessing efficiency and privacy are assessed in terms of the probability of correct guessing. We define h (PXY , ε) as the maximum probability of correctly guessing Y given an auxiliary random variable Z, where the maximization is taken over all P Z|Y ensuring that the probability of correctly guessing X given Z does not exceed ε. We show that the map ε → h(PXY , ε) is strictly increasing, concave, and piecewise linear, which allows us to derive a closed form expression for h(PXY , ε) when X and Y are connected via a binary-input binary-output channel. For {(Xi, Yi)} n i=1 being pairs of independent and identically distributed binary random vectors, we similarly define h n (PXnY n , ε) under the assumption that Z n is also a binary vector. Then we obtain a closed form expression for h n (PXnY n , ε) for sufficiently large, but nontrivial values of ε.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARIES
Given private information, represented by a random variable X, non-private observable information, say Y , is generated via a fixed channel P Y |X . Consider two communicating agents Alice and Bob, where Alice observes Y and wishes to disclose it to Bob as accurately as possible in order to receive a payoff, but in such a way that X is kept almost private from him. Given the joint distribution P XY , Alice chooses a random mapping P Z|Y , a so-called privacy filter, to generate a new random variable Z, called the displayed data, such that Bob can guess Y from Z with as small error probability as possible while Z cannot be used to efficiently guess X.
The tradeoff between utility and privacy was addressed from an information-theoretic viewpoint in [1] - [5] , where both utility and privacy were measured in terms of information-theoretic quantities. In particular, in [2] both utility and privacy were measured in terms of the mutual information I. Specifically, the so-called rate-privacy function g(P XY , ε) was defined as the maximum of I(Y ; Z) over all P Z|Y such that I(X; Z) ≤ ε. In the most stringent privacy setting ε = 0, called perfect privacy, it was shown that g(P XY , 0) > 0 if and only if X is weakly independent of Y , that is, if the set of vectors {P X|Y (·|y) : y ∈ Y} is linearly dependent. In [4] , an equivalent result was obtained in terms of the singular values of the operator f → E[f (X)|Y ]. Although a connection between this information-theoretic privacy measure and a coding theorem is established in [2] and [6] , the use of mutual information as a privacy measure is not satisfactorily motivated in an operational sense. To find a measure of privacy with a clear operational meaning, in this paper we take an estimation-theoretic approach and This work was supported in part by NSERC define both privacy and utility measures in terms of the probability of guessing correctly.
Given discrete random variables U ∈ U and V ∈ V, the probability of correctly guessing U given V is defined as
where the first maximum is taken over all functions g : V → U. It is easy to show that P c satisfies the data processing inequality, i.e., P c (U |W ) ≤ P c (U |V ) for U , V and W which form the Markov chain U − − V − − W . Thus, we measure privacy in terms of P c (X|Z) which quantifies the advantage of an adversary observing Z in guessing X in a single shot attempt.
A similar operational measure of privacy was recently proposed in [7] , where P Z|X is said to be ε-private if log Pc(U |Z) Pc(U ) ≤ ε for all auxiliary random variables U satisfying U − − X − − Z. This requirement guarantees that no randomized function of X can be efficiently estimated from Z, which leads to a strong privacy guarantee. In [8] , maximal correlation [9] was proposed as another measure of privacy. Operational interpretations corresponding to this privacy measure are given in [10] for the discrete case and in [11] for a continuous setup.
To quantify the conflict between utility and privacy, we define the privacy-aware guessing function h as h(P XY , ε) := sup
Due to the data processing inequality, we can restrict the privacy threshold ε to the interval [P c (X), P c (X|Y )], where P c (X) is the probability of correctly guessing X in the absence of any side information. For ε close to P c (X), the privacy guarantee P c (X|Z) ≤ ε intuitively means that it is nearly as hard to guess X observing Z as it is without observing Z.
We derive functional properties of the map ε → h(P XY , ε). In particular, we show that it is strictly increasing, concave, and piecewise linear. Piecewise linearity (Theorem 1), which is the most important and technically difficult result in the paper, allows us to derive a tight upper bound on h(P XY , ε) for general P XY . As a consequence of concavity, we derive a closed form expression for h(P XY , ε) for any ε ∈ [P c (X), P c (X|Y )] when X and Y are both binary. It is shown (Theorem 2) that either the Z-channel or the reverse Z-channel achieves h(P XY , ε) in this case depending on the backward channel.
We also consider the vector case for a pair of binary random vectors (X n , Y n ) under an additional constraint that Z n is a binary random vector. Here, Z n is revealed publicly and the goal is to guess Y n under the privacy constraint P c (X n |Z n ) ≤ ε n . This model can be viewed as a privacy-constrained version of the correlation distil-lation problem studied in [12] . Suppose Alice and Bob respectively observe Y n and Z n , where {(Y i , Z i )} n i=1 is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to the joint distribution P Y Z , and assume that they are to design non-constant Boolean functions f and g such that Pr(f (Y n ) = g(Z n )) is maximized. A dimension-free upper bound for this probability was given in [12] . Now suppose P Y Z is not given and Alice is to design
according to P XY with |X | = |Y| = 2 and P Y |X is a binary symmetric channel, then the maximum of P c (Y n |Z n ) under the privacy constraint P c (X n |Z n ) ≤ ε n admits a closed form expression for sufficiently large but nontrivial ε. This then provides a lower bound for the privacy-constrained correlation distillation problem due to the trivial fact that
We omit the proof of most of the results due to space limitations. The proofs are available in [13] .
II. SCALAR CASE
Suppose X and Y are discrete random variables with finite alphabets X = {1, . . . , M} and Y = {1, . . . , N}, respectively, and with joint distribution P = {P XY (x, y), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y}, whose marginals over X and Y are (p 1 , . . . , p M ) and (q 1 , . . . , q N ), respectively. Let X represent the private data and Y represent a non-private measurement of X, which, upon passing it via a privacy filter P Z|Y , is publicly displayed as Z. In order to quantify the conflict between privacy with respect to X and utility with respect to Y , the so-called rate-privacy function g(P, ε) was introduced in [2] . In what follows, we use Arimoto's mutual information to generalize this definition.
A. The Utility-Privacy Function of Order (ν, μ)
Let H ν (X) and H A ν (X|Z) denote respectively the Rényi entropy of order ν and Arimoto's conditional entropy of order ν [14] , defined for ν > 1 as
and
We define (by continuity)
. Arimoto's mutual information of order ν ≥ 1 is defined as (see, e.g., [14] )
Definition 1. For a given joint distribution P and a pair (ν, μ), ν, μ ∈ [1, ∞], the utility-privacy function of order (ν, μ) is
Note that D ν (P, ε) cannot be empty since all channels P Z|Y with Z independent of X satisfy I A ν (X; Z) = 0, and so they belong to D ν (P, ε) for any ε ≥ 0. Using a similar technique as in [15] , one can show that ε → g (ν,μ) (P, ε) is strictly increasing for any ν, μ ≥ 1. It is also worth mentioning that an application of Minkowski's inequality implies that the map
is convex for ν ≥ 1, and thus the maximum in the definition of g (ν,μ) (P, ε) is achieved at the boundary of the feasible set where I A ν (X; Z) = ε. We denote g (∞,∞) (P, ε) and g (1,1) (P, ε) respectively by g ∞ (P, ε) and g(P, ε).
We note that for small ε the condition I A ∞ (X; Z) ≤ ε intuitively means that it is nearly as hard for an adversary observing Z to predict X as it is without Z. Therefore, g ∞ (P, 0) quantifies the efficiency of guessing Y from Z such that P c (X|Z) = P c (X). It is thus interesting to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for P under which g ∞ (P, 0) > 0. We obtain such a condition for the special case of binary X and Y in the next section.
In general, the map ν → I A ν (X; Z) is not monotonic 1 and hence P Z|Y might belong to D ν (P, ε) but not to D μ (P, ε) for μ < ν. Nevertheless, the following lemma allows us to obtain upper and lower bounds for g (ν,μ) (P, ·) in terms of g ∞ (P, ·). Lemma 1. Let (X, Y ) be a pair of random variables having joint distribution P and ν, μ ∈ (1, ∞). Then
This lemma shows that the family of functions g (ν,μ) (P, ε) for ν, μ > 1 can be bounded from above and below by g ∞ (P, δ) , where δ depends on ε and ν. The case ν = μ = 1 is studied in [2] . As a result, in the following section we only focus on g ∞ (P, ε). It turns out that it is easier to study h(P, ε), defined in (1), instead. It is straightforward to verify that
and hence all the results for h(P, ε) can be translated to results for g ∞ (P, ε) . In particular, perfect privacy g ∞ (P, 0) corresponds to h(P, P c (X)). Notice that h(P, P c (X)) > P c (Y ) is equivalent to g ∞ (P, 0) > 0. As opposed to I ν (X; Z) with 1 ≤ ν < ∞, I ∞ (X; Z) = 0 does not 1 It is relatively easy to show that if X is uniformly distributed, then I A ν (X; Z) coincides with Sibson's mutual information of order ν [14] which is known to be increasing in ν [16, Theorem 4] . Consequently, necessarily imply the independence of X and Z (unless X is uniformly distributed). In particular, the weak independence 2 argument from [2, Lemma 10] (see also [4] ) cannot be applied for g ∞ . For the sake of brevity, we simply write h(ε) for h(P, ε) when there is no risk of confusion.
B. Privacy-Aware Guessing Function
It is clear from (1) It can be verified that F → P(P, F ) and F → U(P, F ) are continuous convex functions over F. It can also be shown that the set R := {(P(P, F ), U(P, F )) : F ∈ F} is convex. Furthermore, since the graph of h(ε) is the upper boundary of R, we conclude that ε → h(ε) is concave, and so it is strictly increasing and continuous on [P c (X), P c (X|Y )]. As a consequence, for every ε ∈ [P c (X), P c (X|Y )] there exists G such that P(P, G) = ε and U (P, G) = h(ε). We call such a privacy filter G optimal at ε.
The following theorem reveals that h(·) is a piecewise linear function, as depicted in Fig. 1 . The proof of the previous theorem is heavily based on the following technical, yet intuitive, result: for every G ∈ F, there exists δ > 0 such that H is linear on [G, G + δD] for every D ∈ D(G).
The proof technique allows us to derive the slope of h on [ε i−1 , ε i ], given the family of optimal filters at a single point ε ∈ [ε i−1 , ε i ]. For example, since the family of optimal filters at ε = P c (X|Y ) is easily obtainable, it is then possible to compute h on the last interval. In the binary case, this observation and the concavity of h allow us to show that h is linear on its entire domain [P c (X), P c (X|Y )].
C. Binary Case
Assume now that X and Y are both binary. Let BIBO(α, β) denote a binary input binary output channel from X to Y with P Y |X (·|0) = (ᾱ, α) and P Y |X (·|1) = (β,β), wherex :
The binary symmetric channel with crossover probability α, denoted by BSC(α), and also the Z-channel with crossover probability β, denoted by Z(β), are both examples of BIBO(α, β), corresponding to α = β and α = 0, respectively. Let q := Pr(Y = 1). We say that perfect privacy yields a non-trivial utility if P c (Y |Z) > P c (Y ) for some Z such that P c (X|Z) = P c (X), or equivalently, if h(p) > max{q, q}. The following lemma determines h(p) in the non-trivial caseᾱp > βp.
where q = αp +βp and
Notice that 1 − ζq >q if and only if ζ < 1, which occurs if and only if p ∈ ( 1 2 , 1). Also, it is straightforward to show that 1 − ζq > q if and only if αᾱp 2 < ββp 2 . In particular, we have the following necessary and sufficient condition for non-trivial utility under perfect privacy.
2 ) such thatᾱp > βp. Then g ∞ (P, 0) > 0 if and only if αᾱp 2 < ββp 2 and p ∈ ( 1 2 , 1). Remark that the condition αᾱp 2 < ββp 2 can be equivalently written as
2017 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) Fig. 2 . The optimal privacy filters for P Y |X = BIBO(α, β).
The following theorem establishes the linear behavior of h when P Y |X = BIBO(α, β) . 1 2 ). Ifᾱp > βp, then for any ε ∈ [p,ᾱp +βp], we have the following:
Furthermore, h(ε) is achieved by the Z-channel Z(ζ(ε)) (as shown in Fig. 2 ).
Moreover, h(ε) is achieved by a reverse Z-channel with crossover probabilityζ(ε) (as shown in Fig. 2) .
Proof Sketch. Recall that ε → h(ε) is concave, and thus its graph lies above the segment connecting (p, h(p)) to (P c (X|Y ), 1). In particular,
By Lemma 2, the above inequality becomes
Since ε → h(ε) is piecewise linear, its right derivative exists at ε = P c (X|Y ). Using the geometric properties of H used to prove Theorem 1, we can show that
which is equal to the slope of the chord connecting (p, h(p)) to (P c (X|Y ), 1) described in (4) . The concavity of h(·) thus implies that the inequality (4) is indeed equality.
Under the hypotheses of the previous theorem, for every ε ∈ [P c (X), P c (X|Y )] there exists a Z-channel that achieves h(ε). It can be shown that Z-channel is the only binary filter with this property. It is also worth mentioning that even if P Y |X is symmetric (i.e., α = β), the optimal filter cannot be symmetric, unless X is uniform, in which case BSC(0.5ζ(ε)) is also optimal.
III. I.I.D. BINARY SYMMETRIC VECTOR CASE
We next study privacy aware guessing for a pair of binary random vectors (X n , Y n ) with X n , Y n ∈ {0, 1} n . Recall that in this case it is sufficient to consider auxiliary random variables having supports of cardinality 2 n + 1. However, this condition may be practically inconvenient. Moreover, in the scalar binary case examined in the last section we observed that a binary Z was sufficient to achieve h(ε). Hence, it is natural to require the privacy filters to produce also binary random vectors, i.e., Z n ∈ {0, 1} n , which leads to the following definition. Recall that the data processing inequality implies that P c (X n ) ≤ P c (X n |Z n ) ≤ P c (X n |Y n ) and hence we can assume P c (X n ) ≤ ε n ≤ P c (X n |Y n ).
Definition 2. For a given pair of binary random vectors
where the maximum is taken over all (not necessarily memoryless) channels P Z n |Y n such that Z n ∈ {0, 1} n ,
Note that this definition does not make any assumption about the privacy filters P Z n |Y n except that Z n ∈ {0, 1} n . From an implementation point of view, the simplest privacy filter is a memoryless one such that Z k is a noisy version of Y k for k = 1, . . . , n. More precisely, we are interested in a single BIBO channel P Z|Y which, given Y k , generates Z k according to P Z n |Y n (z n |y n ) = n k=1 P Z|Y (z k |y k ). Now, let h i n (ε) be defined as max P 1/n c (Y n |Z n ), where the maximum is taken over such memoryless privacy filters satisfying P c (X n |Z n ) ≤ ε n . Let ⊕ denote mod 2 addition.
In what follows, we study h n and h i n for the following setup: a) X 1 , . . . , X n are i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) random variables
Bernoulli(α) random variables independent of X n , such that α < 1 2 . We first determine h i n (ε) for this model and show that (as expected) h i n (ε) is independent of n. According to this model, P c (X n ) = p n and P c (X n |Y n ) =ᾱ n , and thus p ≤ ε ≤ᾱ. Note that the proposition reduces to Theorem 2 for n = 1. However, for n ≥ 2, we have h i n (ε) < h n (ε) ≤ Fig. 3 . The optimal privacy filter for h 2 (ε) for ε ∈ [ε L ,ᾱ), where ζ2(ε) is defined in (6) . h(P X n Y n , ε), as implied by the following theorem. A channel W is said to be a 2 n -ary Z-channel, denoted by Z n (γ), if the input and output alphabets are {0, 1} n and W(a|a) = 1 for a = 1, W(0|1) = γ, and W(1|1) =γ, where 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) and 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) . ᾱ] , where q = αp +ᾱp and ζ n (ε) :=ᾱ n − ε n (ᾱp) n − (αp) n .
Moreover, the channel Z n (ζ n (ε)) achieves h n (ε) in this interval (see Fig. 3 for the case n = 2).
The memoryless privacy filter assumed in h i n (ε) is simple to implement. However, it is clear from Theorem 3 that this simple filter is not optimal even when (X n , Y n ) is i.i.d. since h n (ε) is a function of n, while h i n (ε) is not. The following corollary bounds the loss resulting from using a simple memoryless filter instead of an optimal one for ε ∈ [ε L ,ᾱ]. Clearly, for n = 1, there is no gap as h 1 (ε) = h i 1 (ε).
Corollary 2. Let (X n , Y n ) satisfy a) and b) with p ∈ [ 1 2 , 1) and α ∈ [0, 1 2 ) such thatᾱ > p. If p > 1 2 and α > 0, then for ε ∈ [ε L ,ᾱ] and sufficiently large n
where Φ(n) := q nᾱn−1 (ᾱp) n − (αp) n .
If p = 1 2 , then
for every n ≥ 1 and ε ∈ [ε L ,ᾱ].
Since Φ(n) ↓ 0 as n → ∞, (7) implies that, as expected, the gap between the performance of the optimal privacy filter and the optimal memoryless privacy filter increases as n increases. This observation is numerically illustrated in Fig. 4 , where h n (ε) is plotted as a function of ε for n = 2 and n = 10. Moreover, (8) implies that when p = 1 2 and α is small, then h n (ε) can be approximated by h i n (ε). Thus, we can approximate the optimal filter Z n (ζ n (ε)) with a simple memoryless filter given by Z k = Y k ⊕ W k , where W 1 , . . . , W n are i.i.d. Bernoulli(0.5ζ(ε)) random variables that are independent of (X n , Y n ).
